

Union Budget 2017-18 may not add much to FY18 GDP growth

Expect redistribution of wealth, not a fiscal stimulus

Demonetization is likely to bring in additional resources to the government with more individuals coming under the tax net. In this note, we argue that even if the Union government announces to redistribute the entire pool of additional resources to the general public in form of tax breaks or higher spending under Budget 2017-18, it may not add much to FY18 GDP growth. However, if the redistribution leads to higher investments, we could see some boost to GDP growth in the subsequent years. It is also likely that such redistribution could also convert savings/investments into consumption, which (as we have argued several times) is highly unsustainable and undesirable.

The market is expecting a fiscal stimulus following demonetization, and it will be interesting to see how the government acts to meet these expectations. In case the Union government announces to spend additional resources or convert them into tax breaks, we believe it may have little impact on FY18 GDP growth. Also, even if the government decides to relax its fiscal deficit target for FY18 (say from 3% to 3.5%), it may not necessarily stimulate the economy.

Against this backdrop, we will discuss in this note about the more general argument of how the government could stimulate the economy.

Union Budget 2017-18 unlikely to add much to FY18 GDP growth...

We expect the government to stick to its fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP for FY18 (*Exhibit 1*). Also, we are more likely to see redistribution of wealth rather than a fiscal stimulus. Following demonetization, tax evaders are expected to have to share a portion of their wealth with the government, which, in turn, is likely to be redistributed among honest tax payers (by cutting individual income tax rates or reducing corporate tax rate) and other domestic entities (by increasing its spending). However, we argue that such redistribution may not impact FY18 GDP growth much. In the worst case scenario, it would convert investments/savings into consumption, which (as we have argued several times), is highly unsustainable and undesirable.

Redistribution may not impact FY18 GDP growth much. In the worst case scenario, it would convert investments/savings into consumption, which is highly unsustainable and undesirable

Exhibit 1: Union government had revised its fiscal deficit targets in 2015-16 Union Budget (% of GDP)





Exhibit 2: Longer-term trend in fiscal deficit of the central government (% of GDP)



Source: Union Budget documents, MoSL

Let's assume there are three parties: Mr Evader (group of people evading taxes earlier, but entering into the tax base in FY18), Mr Honest (including all honest tax payers and other private parties) and Mr Government. Since demonetization is expected to widen the tax base by bringing more individuals under the tax net, Mr Evader will have to share a portion of his wealth with Mr Government. In turn, Mr Government is expected to transfer these additional resources to Mr Honest (either via tax breaks or higher spending). In case Mr Evader was consuming these resources before paying them as taxes to Mr Government, we believe the mere transfer of this spending power from Mr Evader to Mr Honest should not lead to any net change in spending on domestically produced goods & services. There may certainly be a change in the composition of spending, but aggregate spending and thus GDP growth for FY18 will not be impacted much.

Alternatively, it is possible that Mr Evader was saving these resources rather than consuming. Mr Government would now consume such resources. Thus, domestic savings will be converted into consumption. In case these were financial savings of Mr Evader (held as currency), paying them to Mr Government will now reduce resources to finance non-household investments. If these were physical savings of Mr Evader, it reduces investments directly. In other words, the government will effectively convert investments/savings into consumption. Not only does this have hardly any impact on GDP, but it also replaces a sustainable driver of growth with an unsustainable one.

...however, it may help boost GDP growth in subsequent years – all depends on how government uses the additional resources

Nevertheless, if the government chooses to use additional resources on capital spending, it may affect GDP growth positively in subsequent years but not in FY18. However, with the government almost unanimously expected to compensate Indian citizens for the pain incurred due to demonetization, it is highly likely that the majority of additional resources will be redistributed in the form of tax breaks and higher revenue spending, leaving only a small portion for capital spending. If this is the case, then it is unlikely to have any substantial impact on GDP growth for FY18 or any subsequent year.

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We believe that unless higher fiscal deficit, during normal economic environment, is financed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) or foreign entities (to an extent), there is no incremental effect on GDP growth

Under the current scenario, although the private investments are under stress, private consumption is not. Thus, higher government borrowings should be exclusively used for capital spending

If the new government papers are bought by any domestic entity other than the monetary authority, it would not have any positive impact on demand of domestically produced goods & services in the economy

Higher fiscal deficit may also not necessarily push GDP growth

Usually, fiscal stimulus is associated with higher-than-expected fiscal deficit in a particular year. Although we do not expect the government to breach its fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP for FY18, we argue that even higher fiscal deficit and thus higher borrowings do not necessarily imply higher-than-otherwise GDP growth. Under normal circumstances, higher fiscal deficit has the potential to crowd out the private sector and is thus not desirable. We believe that unless higher fiscal deficit (during normal economic environment) is financed by the monetary authority or foreign entities (to some extent), there is no incremental effect on GDP growth.

During slowdown and episodes of private sector stress, higher government borrowings convert private savings into consumption (to the extent of revenue spending) or investments (to the extent of capital spending). Under the current scenario, although private investments are under stress, private consumption is not (average growth of 7% over past four years). Thus, higher government borrowings should be exclusively used for capital spending, in our view. Nevertheless, the prior episodes make it clear that the government's ability to increase its capital spending is limited and that increasing government consumption is politically more feasible. However, the latter could potentially fuel inflationary pressures in the economy.


Higher fiscal deficit crowds out private sector under normal circumstances...

To understand this argument, one needs to answer a simple question: ***What is the source of funding for tax cuts or higher spending by the government?*** Let us engage in some thought experiments to understand this.

Let's assume that the government expands its fiscal deficit and decides to finance it through market borrowings, which account for ~85% of total fiscal deficit (*Exhibit 3*). Let's further assume that commercial banks, which are the largest holder of dated government securities (*Exhibit 4*), decide to invest in the new government papers (floated to borrow resources to finance fiscal stimulus). Where do the banks get money from to invest in government securities? It is likely to be from deposits, which were otherwise most likely to be used for credit to the private sector (considering normal economic environment). Thus, higher government borrowings, in this case, crowds out the private sector. Nevertheless, since banks have decided to divert their resources to the government (away from the private sector), there is no net change in total spending on domestically produced goods & services in the economy.


Similarly, if the new government papers are bought by insurance companies or pension funds or corporates or any domestic entity other than the monetary authority, it would not have any positive impact on demand for domestically produced goods & services. This is simply because higher government borrowing to spend more (or cut tax rates) simply replaces demand of some other domestic entity.

Exhibit 3: Key sources of financing central government fiscal deficit (% of total)



Based on average of the past three years

Exhibit 4: Key holders of dated government securities (% of total)



Source: Controller General of Accounts (CGA), RBI, CEIC, MoSL

However, in case the monetary authority (Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in India’s case) funds the new government borrowings, it does not replace demand by any other domestic entity in the economy and thus creates more demand. This is because the RBI has the ability to create new money by buying additional government securities. This new money should ideally help create additional production of goods & services (or will lead to higher inflation).

Further, let’s assume the new government securities are bought by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) – their share has increased from 1% in FY12 to ~4% by September 2016 (*Exhibit 4*). In this case also, there is no offsetting impact on any other domestic entity, and the new money is brought in via foreign savings. If foreign capital inflows are converted into current account deficit (CAD), it will add to GDP growth. However, capital inflows sucked by the RBI (to build foreign exchange reserves) will not add anything to GDP growth. With higher CAD, FII purchase of government bonds will lead to additional demand for domestically produced goods & services. However, this positive impact on GDP growth could also be offset if higher CAD (higher imports or lower exports) replaces domestic production of goods & services.

Thus, under normal circumstances, higher fiscal deficit leads to incrementally higher demand of goods & services if and only if new borrowing is financed by either the monetary authority or by foreign entities (to some extent).

...while it may create unsustainable growth in the current environment

Nevertheless, it may not be fair to assume that the current economic environment is normal. It is conceivable that when the private sector (households/private corporate) is under immense stress, the government must increase its borrowings because it does not lead to crowd-out. Weak private investments in India reflect that commercial banks may have limited opportunity to lend to the private sector. Thus, its ability to invest more in government bonds will actually help convert domestic savings into government spending rather than exporting it to the rest of the world via improved current account balance.

Higher fiscal deficit leads to incrementally higher demand of goods & services if and only if the new borrowing is financed by either the monetary authority or by foreign entities (to some extent)

Banks’ ability to invest more in government bonds will help convert domestic savings into government spending rather than exporting it to the rest of the world via improved current account balance


If the government has to stimulate the economy and increase borrowings (or fiscal deficit), it must focus on spending on infrastructure rather than revenue account

However, it is of utmost importance to monitor the quality of fiscal stimulus. For the Indian economy, while investment has grown at an average of only 2.5% for three years, private consumption has grown at 7% over the corresponding period. Therefore, if the government has to stimulate the economy and increase borrowings (or fiscal deficit), it must focus on spending on infrastructure rather than revenue account. This is in sharp contrast to developed economies, where very low inflation for several years gives sufficient room to the governments to spend more without worrying about the quality of stimulus. There are, however, two constraints in allowing wider fiscal deficit in the Indian economy. First, realistically, almost invariably, fiscal stimulus in the form of higher spending happens on revenue account rather than capital account. A look at the share of capital spending to total government expenditure reveals that the ratio has not moved dramatically over past few years (*Exhibit 5*). Over the past decade, fiscal deficit has widened in three years – FY09, FY10 and FY12. Notably, capital spending declined in absolute terms in FY09, went up by 25% of the total increase in fiscal deficit in FY10 and increased by only 1% of higher deficit in FY12.

Central government alone cannot revive the investment cycle in Indian economy because it accounts for only ~6% of total investments in the economy


Secondly, the central government alone cannot revive the investment cycle in the Indian economy because it accounts for only ~6% of total investments (*Exhibit 6*). In FY15, the private corporate sector accounted for ~43% of total investments, while general government (Central + state governments) accounted for ~13%.

Exhibit 5: Change in capital spending during periods of fiscal stimulus over the past decade in India



Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Budget documents, MoSL

Exhibit 6: Break-up of investment (GFCF+ inventories) by different participants in FY15 (% of total)



* Central + state governments

In case, the government decides to pass on the entire pool of additional resources to the general public, it will not add much to FY18 GDP growth

Overall, we believe that the Union government is likely to stick to its self-imposed fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP for FY18. In case, the government decides to pass on the entire pool of additional resources (collected due to a wider individual tax base) to the general public, it will not add much to FY18 GDP growth. However, there could be some boost to GDP growth in subsequent years to the extent that these additional resources are spent on capital account rather than redistributing to the general public as tax breaks (or spending on revenue account).

Further, we also argue that fiscal stimulus associated with expansion in fiscal deficit does not add anything to GDP growth during that year, unless new borrowings are financed by the monetary authority (or foreigners, to some extent). Under the current economic scenario in India, higher deficit makes sense only if the government decides to spend all additional resources on capital account, which is not an easy task.

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